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The enactment of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA)I and its related legislation, the Newborns' and
Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996 (NMHPAf and the Mental Health
Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA)3 (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"HIPAA .and its related legislation") signals a possible new role for the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),4 the federal
law governing private health care plans.5 HIPAA and its related legislation
* Associate Professor of Law, University ofTennessee College of Law. B.A., J.D.
University of Kansas.
\. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.A., 29 U.S.c.A., & 42 U.S.C.A.).
. 2. Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2935 (codified in scattered sections of 29
U.S.c.A. & 42 U.S.c.A.).
3. Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (codified in scattered sections of 29
U.S.c.A. & 42 U.S.c.A.).
4. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.c. & 29 U.S.C).
5. Employee benefit plans subject to Title I of ERISA consist of employee welfare
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represent a broadening, in the private health care context, of ERISA's Title
I protective provisions from disclosure and fiduciary administration
requirements to substantive benefit and coverage requirements in targeted
areas. HIPAA and its related legislation also potentially signal a new
approach by Congress to the issue of ERISA preemption of state insurance
laws in the private health care plan context for those targeted areas where
Congress has created new federal requirements. These changes may
foreshadow a new willingness by Congress to use ERISA increasingly in the
future to establish and enforce minimum federal standards, in targeted areas,
for private health care plan coverage and benefits.
As evidenced by the variety of topics addressed in this symposium issue,
there are numerous facets to refonn of the health care system in the United
States. Although a global answer to the issue of health care refonn is
elusive, one thing is clear: ERISA, long identified by scholars and
politicians as a primary source of the health care "problem," must also be
part of "the solution." Approximately sixty percent (estimates vary) of
Americans under the age of sixty-five receive their health care coverage
through their employment.6 The failure of the Clinton Administration's
ambitious health care refonn initiative indicates that this employment-based
health care system is likely to remain intact as America moves into the next
century. To the extent health care coverage is regulated- by federal law,
Title I of ERISA is the federal statute primarily responsible for regulating
employment-based health care plans. Thus, one legislatively convenient way
for Congress to enact targeted health care reforms in the future for a
significant percentage of the United States population is to incorporate these
reforms into ERISA's Title I requirements for private health care plans.
Part I of this article provides a brief review of the original legislative
reform objectives underlying the enactment of ERISA in 1974. The
overview discusses how the perceived abuses initially targeted by Title I's
protective provisions related primarily to pension plans, not welfare plans.
benefit plans (welfare plans) and employee pension benefit plans (pension plans). See 29
U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1994). In ERISA parlance, health care plans are a type of welfare plan.
See id. § 1002(1). Title I of ERISA governs any welfare plan that is established or
maintained by any employer and/or employee organization representing employees. See id.
§ 1003(a). Title I of ERISA generally excludes plans established for the employees of
churches or plans established for the employees of federal, state, and local governments or
agencies. See id. §§ 1002(32) (defining governmental plans), 1002(33) (defining church
plans), 1003 (defining general coverage of ERISA). The term "private health care plan" is
used in this article to connote employment-based health care plans subject to Title I of
ERISA.
6. See S. REP. No. 104-156, at 3 (1995) (estimating that 61 % ofAmericans receive
their health care through their employment); CELIA SILVERMAN ET AL., EBRI DATABOOK ON
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 238 (3d ed. 1995) (estimating that 57% of Americans receive their
health care through their employment).
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As a result, Title I of ERISA, as originally enacted, contained numerous
substantive coverage and benefits requirements for pension plans, but lacked
similar substantive coverage and benefits requirements for private health
care plans. Part I also illustrates the significance today of the dichotomy
created in 1974 between "insured" and "self-insured" private health care
plans by ERISA's preemption provisions with respect to state insurance law
mandated benefits.
Part II of this article opens with a review of the amendments to Title I
of ERISA enacted as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1985 (COBRA)? and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993 (OBRA).8 The COBRA and OBRA amendments to ERISA estab-
lished the first Title I coverage and benefits requirements for private health
care plans in targeted areas. Against this background, the remainder of Part
II analyzes the changes made to Title I of ERISA by HIPAA and its related
legislation. Part II concludes that these changes may foreshadow a new role
for ERISA in the regulation of private health care plans. This possible new
role appears to have two related implications for health care reform in the
future. First, Congress is likely to continue to establish substantive federal
coverage and benefits requirements for private health care plans in targeted
areas through Title I of ERISA. Second, in areas where federal require-
ments have been established for private health care plans, ERISA's
preemption provisions are likely to operate as a "floor," preempting lesser
state law requirements for insured private health care plans while preserving
state law requirements for insured plans that offer greater benefits and
protections to plan participants.
Finally, in keeping with the theme of this symposium issue, Part III of
this article concludes with the identification of some of the emerging issues
raised by this new role for ERISA in the regulation of private health care
plans.
I. ERISA's ORIGINAL LEGISLATIVE REFORM OBJECTIVES9
As originally enacted in 1974, Title I of ERISA established extensive
substantive requirements for pension plan coverage and benefits. 10 In con-
7. Pub. L. No. 99-272. § 10002(a). 100 Stat. 227, 227-31 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
1161-1168 (1994».
8. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 4301,107 Stat. 312,371 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.c. §
1169 (1994».
9. Due to page limitations, the discussion below relies heavily on the conventional
historical view of ERISA presented in chapter I of the American Bar Association's one-
volume treatise on ERISA, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW (1991)
[hereinafter EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW], and the House and Senate Reports accompanying
ERISA, see infra note 13.
10. See infra notes 28-31, 40-46 and accompanying text.
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trast, Title I's requirements for private health care plans were limited to the
selected areas of informational disclosures to plan participants, fiduciary
conduct, and remedies for plan participants. II Title I initially did not
establish substantive federal requirements for private health care plan
coverage and benefits. 12
A. Pre-ERISA Reform Attempts
ERISA's regulation of both private health care plans and pension plans
under a single set of common rules in Title I appears to have been much
more the product of a common history of perceived abuses rather than of a
commonality of plan purpose, design, and function. In the post-World War
II United States economy, private employers increasingly began to otTer
their employees retirement and health care benefits. 13 As industries
became unionized and employee benefits became a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining,14 labor unions established retirement and health care
trust funds to provide pension and health care benefits to union members. IS
As these union funds grew in size, so did concerns that the fund assets
presented opportunities for abuse by plan fiduciaries. '6
These concerns arose in part because the funds were administered by
union officials without any legal obligation to account to either the contrib-
uting employers or the union membership.17 In response to this concern,
Congress enacted section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 (LMRA or Taft-Hartley Act).'8 Section 302 of the LMRA required
that such union-sponsored Taft-Hartley Act plans be administered by a joint
board of trustees comprised of an equal number of management and labor
representatives. 19 Federal judicial decisions involving the conduct of Taft-
Hartley Act plan trustees began to develop a caselaw-driven body of
II. See infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
12. See Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.c. & 29 U.S.C).
13. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 2 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4640; S. REP. No. 93-127, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4839;
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 9, at 3.
14. See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th CiT. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 960 (1949) (holding that employee benefit plans were terms and conditions of
employment subject to collective bargaining).
15. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 9, at 3.
16. See id. at 4 & n.14.
17. See id.
18. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.c. §§ 141-187 (1994».
19. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1994).
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fiduciary principles for plan administration and the investment of plan
assets. 20
As both pension and health care plans continued to grow in popularity
and size, it became evident that employees participating in such plans
needed additional federal protections. In response, Congress enacted the
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 (WPPDA).21 The
WPPDA required plan administrators to provide certain informational
disclosures to plan participants in the congressional hope that, armed with
such information, plan participants could effectively police the administra-
tion of their own plans. 22 Congress strengthened the WPPDA in 1962 by
making theft, bribery, embezzlement, or kickbacks involving plan ·assets
federal crimes, and by giving the Secretary of Labor limited regulatory and
investigatory powers over employee benefit plans. 23
Both section 302 of the LMRA and the WPPDA proved ineffective in
curbing the abuse of plan assets by plan fiduciaries. Both laws failed to
establish fiduciary standards and civil liability for misconduct that did not
rise to a criminal level. 24 A related area of needed reform common to both
pension and health care plans, which was not addressed by either the LMRA
or the WPPDA, was the elimination of substantive and procedural obstacles
faced by plan participants seeking to enforce their rights in court.25 When
rights and remedies developed under the common law of trusts proved
ineffective in the employee benefit plan context, various states began to
enact their own laws regulating employee benefit plans. 26 The enactment
of these state laws led to concerns by some employers that their employee
benefit plans, which provided benefits to employees in multiple states, could
be subject to compliance under conflicting and inconsistent state laws. 27
20. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 9, at 4 & n.18.
21. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (codified at 29 U.S.C §§ 303-309
(1976)). repealedby Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1.974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
§ Ill(a)(I), 88 Stat. 829, 851. .
22. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 4 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 4639,
4641 (discussing failures of the WPPDA); s. REP. No. 93-127, at 4 (1973), reprintedin 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4840-41 (discussing failures of the WPPDA).
23. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 305-308 (1976), repealed by Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § III (a)( I), 88 Stat. 829, 851.
24. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 4, reprintedin 1974 U.S.CC.A.N. 4639, 4642; S.
REP. No. 93-127, at 4 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 4838, 4841.
25. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 17 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4655; S. REP. No. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871.
26. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 9, at 5.
27. Id. at 5 & n.23.
490 TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW
B. Original ERISA Title I Reforms
[Vol. 65:485
Congress enacted Title I of ERISA in part to address needed refonns in
the areas of plan disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and enforcement of
participants'rights.28 As enacted in 1974, Title I contained five parts, each
addressing an area in need of refonn.29 Of these five, parts I, 4, and 5
apply to both welfare and pension plans.30 Parts 2 and 3 apply only to
pension plans. 31
Part 1 of Title I established requirements for annual reporting to the
government and infonnational disclosures to plan participants.32 These
requirements were more rigorous than the disclosure requirements of the
WPPDA, which were repealed.33 Part 4 established standards for plan
documentation, the handling of plan assets, and civil liability standards for
fiduciary conduct.34 These standards drew upon fiduciary standards
developed under the common law of trusts, but with certain modifications
appropriate for employee benefit plans.35 Part 4 also prohibited certain
types of transactions involving plan assets and allowed for certain exemp-
tions from these prohibited transaction rules. 36 Part 5 provided for criminal
penalties, private civil remedies, and federal court jurisdiction for civil
enforcement actions by plan participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, or the
Secretary of Labor.37 The creation of private causes of action under
ERISA and federal court jurisdiction over such civil actions resolved the
substantive and procedural obstacles faced by plan participants in the courts.
Part 5 also contained ERISA's now controversial preemption provisions,3R
which Congress intended to ensure national unifonnity in the regulation of
employee benefit plans.39
28. See 29 V.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
29. Seeid. §§ 1021-1144.
30. See id. §§ 1021-1030 (part 1), 1101 (coverage of part 4), 1131-1144 (part 5).
31. See id. §§ 1051(1) (excluding welfare benefit plans from part 2 of ERISA),
1081 (1) (excluding welfare benefit plans from part 3 of ERISA).
32. See id. §§ 1021-1030.
33. See id. § 1031(a)(I).
34. See id. §§ 1102-1105, 1109-1112.
35. See H.R. REp. No. 93-533, at 11-13 (1973), reprinted in 1974 V.S.C.C.A.N.
4639,4649-51; S. REP. No. 93-127, at 30 (1973), reprinted in 1974 V.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,
4866.
36. 29 V.S.c. §§ 1106-1108.
37. See id. §§ 1131-1132.
38. See id. § 1144. Exemptions to ERISA's preemption of state laws were later
added for the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, id. § I 144(b)(5), multiple employer welfare
arrangements, id. § I I44(b)(6), and qualified domestic relations orders and qualified medical
child support orders, id. § 1144(b)(7).
39. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 17 (1973), reprintedin 1974 V.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
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Title I of ERISA also contained detailed provisions regulating the
coverage and benefits of pension plans.40 Part 2 of Title I established
minimum standards for employee participation in pension plans,41 mini-
mum standards for the vesting of plan benefits,42 standards for the accrual
and cutback of pension plan benefits,43 standards for the form of benefit
payments,44 and rules governing plan mergers and asset transfers.45 Part
3 of Title I established minimum funding requirements for defined benefit
pension plans.46 Congress enacted these extensive requirements in
response to well-publicized accounts of employees with long years of
service failing to vest in their pension plan benefits and employees not being
paid their full pension plan benefits due to inadequate funding of employers'
plans.47
In contrast to these extensive requirements governing the coverage and
benefits of pension plans, Title I of ERISA, as initially enacted, did not
contain a single substantive coverage or benefit requirement for private
health care plans. This complete absence of federal regulation provides a
baseline from which to evaluate the significance of subsequent congressional
attempts, described in Part II of this article, to regulate the coverage and
benefits provided by private health care plans through Title I of ERISA.
C. "Insured" Versus "Self-Insured" Private Health Care Plans
One consequence of ERISA's Title I preemption provisions, as
interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts48 and in FMC Corp. v. Holiday,49 was the
de facto creation of two categories of private health care plans under
ERISA. "Insured" health care plans provide health care benefits to plan
4647-48; S. REP. No. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 4838, 4851.
40. Other requirements regulating the coverage and benefits for tax-qualified pension
plans are found in part 400 of the Internal Revenue Code. Seegenera/ly26 U.S.c. §§ 401-
417 (1994). ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code contain many overlapping requirements
in the pension plan area.
41. See 29 U.S.c. § 1052 (1994).
42. See id. § 1053.
43. See id. § 1054.
44. See id. §§ 1055-1056.
45. See id. § 1058.
46. See id. §§ 1081-1085.
47. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 5 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4644; S. REP. No. 93-127, at 5 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4845;
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 9, at 6.
48. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
49. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
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participants through the purchase of health care insurance.50 Because
ERISA does not preempt state laws regulating insurance, insurance
companies selling health care insurance policies (and, thus, indirectly the
policy benefits to plan participants) are subject to regulation by state
insurance laws.51 In particular, state insurance laws mandate and regulate
the types of benefits that must be included in health insurance policies. 52
"Self-insured" or "self-funded" health care plans provide health care
benefits to plan participants from a fund comprised of employer or
employee contributions, or both, or out of the general assets of the
employer.53 State laws attempting to regulate employee health care plans
as "insurance" are preempted by ERISA and, therefore, do not apply to self-
insured health care plans.54 The preemption of state laws with respect to
self-insured private health care plans has been criticized often in the
scholarly literature.55 Specifically, critics have argued that, due to ERISA-
's lack of substantive coverage and benefits requirements for private health
care plans, such preemption in effect allows self-insured plans to operate in
a regulatory void.56
Although insured and self-insured plans are easily distinguishable in
theory, in recent years the line between them, and thus the threshold for
state regulation, has become increasingly blurred. To protect against the
risk of catastrophic health care claims, typically self-insured plans purchase
so-called "stop-loss" insurance.57 Stop-loss insurance insures the plan
against claims above a certain dollar amount.58 This dollar amount is
50. Id. at 52-53.
5 I. See 29 U.S.c. § I I44(b)(2)(A) (1994) (savings clause); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co.. 471 U.S. at 746-47.
52. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.• 471 U.S. at 746.
53. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 9, at 1050-52.
54. See 29 U.S.c. § I I44(b)(2)(B) (deemer clause); FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 61.
55. See. e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA
Preemption? A Case Study ofthe Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35,37 n.5
(1996); James E. Holloway. ERISA. Preemption and Comprehensive Federal Health Care:
A Call for "Cooperative Federalism" to Preserve the States' Role in Formulating Health
Care Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L REV. 405, 437-38 (1994); Alan I. Widiss & Larry Gostin,
What's Wrong with the ERISA .. Vacuum "?: The Case Against Unrestricted Freedom for
Employers to Terminate Employee Health Care Plans and to Decide What Coverage Is to Be
Provided When Risk Retention Plans Are Establishedfor Health Care, 41 DRAKE L. REV.
635, 638-44 (1992).
56. See sources cited supra note 55.
57. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 9, at 1051·52; Devon P. Groves,
ERISA Waivers and State Health Care Reform. 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 609, 626
( 1995).
58. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 9, at 1052 & n.619; Groves, supra note
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known as the "attachment point. ,,59 As attachment points have declined,
self-insured plans, in the eyes of state insurance commissioners, have begun.
to resemble insured plans potentially subject to state regulation.60
Stop-loss insurance was at the heart of the issue in American Medical
Security, Inc. v. Bartlett (AMS),61 a recent Fourth Circuit case. The
technical issue before the federal court of appeals in AMS was whether
ERISA preempted a Maryland insurance regulation aimed at stop-loss
insurance policies.62 The regulation provided that any stop-loss insurance
policy with an attachment point of less than $10,000 in benefits paid for an
individual would be considered a health insurance policy and subject to
twenty-eight various types of health care benefits mandated by Maryland
insurance law.63 The Maryland Insurance Commissioner unsuccessfully
argued that if the regulation was preempted by ERISA, a loophole would
exist so that every self-insured health care plan could provide fewer and
lesser benefits than the twenty-eight benefits mandated by Maryland
insurance law.64 Upon finding that "at bottom, state insurance regulation
may not directly or indirectly regulate self-funded ERISA plans;>65 the
Fourth Circuit ruled that "[i]n seeking to require self-funded plans to offer
coverage consistent with state insurance law, Maryland cross[ed] the line of
[ERISA] preemption. ,,66 As a result, the "self-insured" plan was not
subject to the twenty-eight benefits mandated by Maryland insurance law for
"insured" health care plans.67
AMS dramatically illustrates the significance today of the dichotomy
created by Title I's preemption provisions between insured and self-insured
private health care plans. As AMS aptly demonstrates, ERISA preemption
of state insurance laws with respect to self-insured private health care plans
gives plan sponsors a strong incentive to self-insure and thereby avoid
benefits mandated by state insurance law for insured plans.
57, at 626 & n.94
59. See American Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, III F.3d 358, 360 (4th Cir. 1997)
(offering one definition of an attachment point by example).
60. See id. at 361.
61. III F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1997).
62. Id. at 359-60.
63. Id. at 360.
64. Id. at 362.
65. Id. at 361.
66. Id. at 363-64.
67. Id. at 364-65.
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II. FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR PRIVATE HEALTH CARE PLAN COVERAGE
AND BENEFITS UNDER ERISA
A. COBRA and OBRA
Congress enacted the first substantive federal requirements for private
health care plans under Title I of ERISA as part of the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA).68 Eight years
later, additional Title I federal requirements for private health care plans
were created as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(OBRA).69 These two amendments to Title I are. noteworthy as initial
congressional attempts to implement the first substantive federal coverage
and benefits .requirements for private health care plans through ERISA.
COBRA, which became part 6 of Title I, requires that a sponsor of a
group health plan70 provide each qualified beneficiary,71 who otherwise
would lose coverage under the plan due to the occurrence of a qualifying
event,72 the opportunity to continue coverage under the plan. 73 The
maximum period of continuation coverage varies from eighteen to thirty-six
months, depending upon the type of qualifying event that triggers COBRA
rights.74 Failure to comply with COBRA's requirements potentially
subjects the employer (or, in the case of a multi-employer plan, the plan
itself) to a tax penalty of $100 per day, per qualified beneficiary.75
COBRA continuation coverage is not free to the qualified beneficiary, who
may be required by the plan sponsor to pay up to 102% of the applicable
68. Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 10002(a), 100 Stat. 227, 227-31 (1986) (codified at 29
U.S.c. §§ 1161-1168 (1994».
69. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 4301(a), 107 Stat. 371, 371-75 (1993) (codified at 29
U.S.c. § 1169 (1994».
70. Group health plans subject to COBRA include both insured and self-insured
private health care plans. See 29 U.S.c. § 1167(1) (1994). Plans with fewer than 20
employees are exempt from COBRA, see id. § 1161(b), but insured plans with fewer than
20 employees may still be subject to state insurance law COBRA-type requirements.
71. Qualified beneficiaries can include the employee, the employee's spouse, and any
dependent children covered under the plan. See id. § 1167(3).
72. Qualifying events include the death of the covered employee, the termination or
reduction in hours of the covered employee's employment, the divorce of the covered
employee, the covered employee's entitlement to Medicare benefits, or a dependent child
ceasing to meet the requirements for coverage as a dependent child under the terms of the
plan. See id. § 1163.
73. See id. § 1161(a).
74. See id. § 1162.
75. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980B(b)( I) (1994). Minimum and maximum penalty limits may
also apply. See id. § 4980B(b)(3)-(c).
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premium.76 Thus, COBRA may be viewed as creating a limited federal
coverage mandate for those employees who are able to afford the cost of
COBRA coverage premiums. 77
. OBRA added an additional section to part 6 of Title I that created three
new requirements related to benefits for children.78 First, OBRA provided
for an exception to ERISA preemption to permit the enforcement of
qualified medical child support orders. 79 Second, OBRA required that
private health care plans must provide coverage and benefits for adopted
children of plan participants on the same terms and conditions as coverage
for children born to plan participants.8o Third, OBRA prohibited private
health care plans from reducing coverage of pediatric vaccine costs below
the coverage level provided under the plan as of May 1, 1993.81
. In retrospect, the amendments to Title I made by COBRA and OBRA
are interesting in that they represent two possible approaches to financing
health care reforms enacted through ERISA. Under the COBRA approach,
the employer must offer the required Title I benefits only if the employee
pays for them. 82 Moreover, the entire cost of these Title I benefits is born
solely by the individual employee seeking the benefits and is not allocated
among all of the plan participants.83 Under the OBRA approach, if the
plan sponsor chooses to have a health care plan, the plan must contain
certain Title I required benefits.84 The plan sponsor (typically the employ-
er) can decide whether to absorb the additional cost of the required Title 1
benefits or to allocate part or all of the additional costs to the participants
in the plan. As discussed below, HIPAA and its related legislation appear
76. See 29 U.S.c. § 1162(3)(A) (1994).
77. Congress recognized the difficulty unemployed persons may have in paying for
COBRA continuation coverage. Accordingly, effective January I, 1997, HIPAA amended
the Internal Revenue Code to eliminate the 10% penalty on distributions from an individual
retirement account or annuity (IRA) before age 59 1/2 for persons who had received
unemployment compensation for twelve consecutive weeks. This exception applies only if
the IRA distributions are used to pay health insurance premiums. including COBRA
premiums. See Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 361, 110 Stat. 2071, 2071-72 (1996); H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 104-736. at 313-14 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1990,2126-27.
78. See 29 U.S.c. § 1169 (1994).
79. See id. §§ I I44(b)(7), 1169(a). A qualified medical child support order is any
judgment, decree, order, or settlement agreement which is made pursuant to a state domestic
relations law or which enforces a state medical child support law under the federal Medicaid
rules, and which requires a private health care plan to provide coverage to the child of a plan
participant. See id. § I I69(a)(2)(A)-(B).
80. See id. § 1169(c).
81. See id. § 1169(d).
82. See id. § 1162(3).
83. See id.
84. See id. § 1169.
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to reject the COBRA financing approach and instead follow the OBRA
approach.
B. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
Prior to the enactment of HIPAA and its related legislation, Congress
made several attempts at health care reform during the 1990s, all without
success.85 In the absence of congressional action on health care reform,
the states stepped to the forefront by enacting laws aimed at "reforming the
health care insurance market.,,86 The state laws particularly targeted the
health insurance market for small employers.87 However, these state-level
insurance law reform efforts were of limited effectiveness for several
reasons. First and foremost, these reforms applied only to insured health
care plans as a result of ERISA's preemption provisions, which exempted
self-insured plans from state insurance law reform efforts.88 Because
approximately forty to fifty percent of the United States population with
private health care insurance coverage obtained coverage through a self-
insured health care plan, preemption of state law was a significant obstacle
to reform.89 Moreover, the trend toward self-insurance was growing.91l
In 1993, sixty-three percent of employers with five hundred or more
employees had self-insured health care plans, whereas by 1994 this
percentage had increased to seventy-four percent.91 .. Furthermore, as the
attachment points on stop-loss insurance policies continued to decline, states
had increasing difficulty determining whether a particular plan was insured
or self-insured.92
Another significant limitation on the effectiveness of state-level reforms
was (and still is) inherent in a federal system of government. State
insurance law reforms applicable in Maine did not apply when an employee
moved or was transferred by his or her employer to Minnesota or Missouri.
This limitation dove-tailed with another significant issue: the perceived
problem of health care ''job-lock'' and the need for nationwide "portability"
of health care coverage.93 Health insurance companies and self-insured
85. See S. REP. No. 104-156, at 9 (1995).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 9-10.
89. See id. at 5 & n.7 (citing Congressional Research Service Report). The General
Accounting Office has estimated a much lower figure-27% of the U.S. population-as
receiving health care coverage through ERISA self-funded plans. See Interim Rules for
Health Insurance Portability for Group Health Plans, 62 Fed. Reg. 16,894, 16,915 (1997).
90. See id. at 5 & n.5 (citing General Accounting Office Report).
91. See id. at 5 (citing Employee Benefits Research Institute data).
92. See id. at 6 & n.9 (citing General Accounting Office Report).
93. See id. at 8; Interim Rules for Health Insurance Portability for Group Health
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plans often restricted or excluded plan coverage for the treatment of health
conditions that existed prior to the time the participant enrolled in the plan
(pre-existing conditions).94 These coverage limitations for pre-existing
conditions were designed to prevent the practice of "adverse selection,"
whereby persons tend to wait until they become ill before obtaining health
care coverage.95 According to one Senate report, "an estimated eighty-one
million Americans suffer from some type of preexisting medical condition
that could make it difficult for them to obtain health coverage, especially for
[their pre-existing] condition[s]," if they changed to a different health
plan.96 As of mid-1996, forty-four states had enacted laws limiting the
duration of pre-existing condition coverage exclusions for insured private
health care plans.97 These laws did not, however, apply to self-insured
private health care plans by virtue of ERISA preemption.98
To address these issues at the federal level, Congress enacted HIPAA.99
HIPAA amended ERISA by adding a new part 7 to Title I of the stat-
ute. IOO Part 7 limits the ability of private health care plans to impose pre-
existing condition coverage exclusions on plan participants. 101 These new
federal requirements, which are effective for plan years beginning after June
30, 1997,102 apply to any private health care plan with at least two
participants who are current employees. 103
Plans, 62 Fed. Reg. at 16,910.
94. See Interim Rules for Health Insurance Portability for Group Health Plans, 62
Fed. Reg. at 16.908 (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics indicating that for 1993-1994,46% of
participants in private sector, employer-sponsored health plans were subject to pre-existing
condition coverage exclusions).
95. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 731 (1985).
96. See S. REP. No. 104-156, at 3.
97. See Interim Rules for Health Insurance Portability for Group Health Plans, 62
Fed. Reg. at 16,914-15. In addition, "thirty states had time limits on pre-existing condition
exclusion periods that are the same as or more favorable to individuals than the HIPAA
provisions for the group market." [d.
98. See 29 U.S.C § I I44(b)(2)(B) (1994).
99. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of26
U.S.CA.. 29 U.S.CA., & 42 U.S.CA.). HIPAA also addresses numerous other health care
reform issues that are beyond the scope of this article, such as reforms of the group and
individual health insurance markets to guarantee availability and renewability of health
insurance coverage, technical amendments to COBRA, Medicare and Medicaid fraud and
abuse. medical savings accounts, and long-term care insurance. [d.
100. ld. § 101, 110 Stat. at 1939-55 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1181-1183, 1191-
1191 c (West. Supp. 1997»
101. 29 U.S.CA. § 1181(a) (West Supp. 1997).
102. [d. § 1181(g)(I).
103. ld. § 1191(a).
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HIPAA provides that a group health plan104 or a health insurance
issuer offering group health insurance coveragel05 may impose a coverage
exclusion for a pre-existing health condition of a plan participant or
beneficiary only under the following circumstances:
(l) the exclusion must relate to a physical or mental condition
for which medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was
recommended or received within the six month period
ending on the participant's enrollment date in the plan; 106
and
(2) the period of the coverage exclusion must not be more than twelve
months; 107 and
(3) the period of the coverage exclusion must be reduced by the
aggregate period of prior creditable coverage. 108
104. A group health plan is defined as "any employee welfare benefit plan ...
provid[ing] medical care ... to employees or their dependents ... directly or through
insurance. reimbursement or otherwise." ld. § 1191(a)(l). Thus, both insured and self-
insured private health care plans are subject to HIPAA's requirements.
105. A health insurance issuer is defined to include health maintenance organizations
(HMOs). Seeid. § 1191(b)(2).
106. See id. § lI81(a)(l).
107. See id. § 1181 (a)(2). This twelve month period extends to a maximum of
eighteen months for "late enrollees." Id. A late enrollee is a plan participant or beneficiary
who fails to enroll in the plan during the first period he or she is eligible to enroll or during
a special enrollment period. See id.
108. See id. § 1181(a)(3). Special rules apply to HMOs limiting the use of an
"affiliation period" in lieu of the pre-existing condition coverage exclusions. See id. §
I 181 (g). Certain benefits, defined as "excepted benefits," are excluded from HIPAA's
requirements. See id. § 119Ia(b). Excepted benefits include:
(A) Coverage only for accident, or disability income insurance.
(B) Coverage issued as a supplement to liability insurance.
(C) Liability insurance, including general insurance liability and automobile liability
insurance.
(D) Workers' compensation or similar insurance.
(E) Automobile medical payment insurance.
(F) Credit-only insurance.
(G) Coverage for on-site medical clinics.
ld. § 119Ib(c)(l). Limited scope dental or vision benefits and benefits for long term care,
nursing home care, home health care, and community-based care are excluded from HIPAA' s
requirements if they are provided under a separate policy, certificate, or contract of insurance
or are otherwise not an integral part of the plan. See id. § 119Ia(c)(2). Similarly, separate
coverage is also excluded from HIPAA's requirements for a specified disease or illness,
hospital indemnity or other fixed indemnity insurance, and Medicare supplemental insurance.
See id. §§ I 19 Ia(c)(2)-(3), 119Ib(c)(3)-(4).
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The key to HIPAA's coverage portability is the reduction of the period
of the plan's pre-existing condition coverage exclusion by the participant's
prior creditable coverage. I09 Creditable coverage is defined broadly by
. HIPAA as almost any type of health care coverage, such as coverage
through a private employer, federal or state government group health plan,
individual health insurance, COBRA coverage, Medicare and Medicaid
coverage, the military, the Indian Health Service, or the Peace COrpS."0
An individual's prior creditable coverage is forfeited, however, if the
participant has a period of sixty-three or more days during which the
individual does not have anyone of the enumerated types of creditable
coverage. II I Thus, if an individual has at least twelve months of prior
health care coverage, enrolls in the subsequent plan at the first opportunity,
and has not experienced a sixty-three consecutive I 12 day lapse in coverage,
the plan effectively is prohibited from imposing any pre-existing condition
coverage exclusions. I 13
In addition to the limitations on the plan's ability to impose pre-existing
condition coverage exclusions, HIPAA prohibits the imposition of pre-
existing condition coverage exclusions, irrespective of the individual's lack
of prior creditable coverage, in the following circumstances:
(I) newborn children enrolled in the plan within thirty days of birth; 114
(2) adopted children under age eighteen enrolled in the plan within thirty
days of adoption or placement for adoption; 115 and
(3) any condition relating to pregnancy. I 16
HlPAA also prohibits group health plans and issuers of group health
insurance from basing health care coverage eligibility on any of the
following health-related factors of the individual or a dependent of the
individual:
(I) Health status.
(2) Medical condition (including both physical and mental illness).
(3) Claims experience.
(4) Receipt of health care.
109. See id. § 1181(a).
110. See id. § 1181(c)(1).
Ill. See id. § 1181(c)(2)(a). The period of time during which an individual is in a
waiting period for eligibility to enroll in the plan (or, for an HMO, an affiliation period) is
not counted toward the sixty-three consecutive-day absence of coverage forfeiture rule. See
id. § I 18 I(c)(2)(b).
112. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.701-4(b)(2)(iii) (1997) (defining a significant break in
coverage as "a period of 63 consecutivedays during all of which the individual does not have
any creditable coverage" (excluding waiting and affiliated periods» (emphasis added).
113. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1181(a).
114. See id. § 1181(d)(l).
liS. See id. § 1181(d)(2).
116. See id. § 1181(d)(3).
50b TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 65:485
(5) Medical history.
(6) Genetic information.
(7) Evidence of insurability l17 (including conditions arising out of acts
of domestic violence). .
(8) Disability. I IS .
HIPAA further prohibits group health plans and issuers of group health plan
insurance from charging an individual more than similarly situated
individuals' for coverage based on any of these health-related factors. 119
HIPAA does not, however, require a group health plan to provide particular
benefits,120 and it allows a group health plan to establish limits or place
restrictions on the amount, level, extent, or nature of the plan's coverage or
benefits for "similarly situated"121 individuals enrolled in the plan. m
Nor does HIPAA restrict the premium amount a plan may charge to all
participants in the group health plan. 123
HIPAA's requirements are generally made enforceable against private
health care plans through a COBRA-type tax penalty of potentially $100 per
day, per individual affected, for failure to comply:24 Minimum and
117. The "inclusion of evidence of insurability in the definition of health status is
intended to ensure ... that individuals are not excluded from health care coverage due to
their participation in activities such as motorcycling, snowmobiling, all-terrain vehicle riding.
horseback riding, skiing and other similar activities." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-736, at 186
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.CCA.N 1990, 1999.
118. See 29 U.S.CA. § I I82(a)(1)(A)-(H).
119. See id. § I I82(b)(I ). Premium discounts, rebates, or reductions in co-payment
or deductible amounts are still permitted for participation in narrowly defined "bona fide
wellness programs." See id. ~ I I82(b)(2)(B); Interim Rules for Health Insurance Portability
for Group Health Plans, 62 Fed. Reg. 16,894, 16,938-39 (1997) (to be codified at 26 CF.R.
§ 54.9802-1 T) (temporary regulations).
120. See 29 U.S.CA. § 1182(a)(2)(A).
121. The Conference Report accompanying HIPAA states that "[t]he term 'similarly
situated' means that a plan or coverage would be permitted to vary benefits available to
different groups of employees, such as full-time versus part-time employees or employees in
different geographic locations. In addition, a plan or coverage could have different benefit
schedules for different ... bargaining units." See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-736, at 187
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.CCA.N. 1990,2000.
122. See 29 U.S.C.A. § I I82(a)(2)(B).
123. See id. § I I82(b)(2)(A).
124. See Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 402, 110 Stat. 2084 (1996) (adding new § 49800 to
the Internal Revenue Code). Congress subsequentlyadded similar COBRA-type tax penalties
to the Code for violations of the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act, discussed
infra Part 11.0, and the Mental Health Parity Act, discussed infra Part II.E, both as part of
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. See Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1531(a)(4), III Stat. 788, 1080-
81 (1997) (adding new § 981 I and § 9812 to the Code).
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maximum tax penalties apply in certain circumstances. 125 Pursuant to
ERISA's civil enforcement provisions, individuals may bring a private cause
of action to enforce the requirements of part 7. 126
Sections 70 I and 702 of HIPAA necessarily operate in unison in a
fashion analogous to the nondiscrimination 'provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code for qualified pension plans. 127 Section 70 I(a) limits or, in
some cases, eliminates the imposition of a pre-existing condition coverage
exclusion upon a new plan participant. '28 In the absence of section
702(a)( I), a group health plan could, rather than admit an individual with
a pre-existing condition (but with no pre-existing condition coverage
exclusion) as a participant in the plan, simply declare the individual
. ineligible to participate in the plan due to the individual's pre-existing health
condition. Section 702(a)(1) prevents such tactics by prohibiting a group
health plan from basing eligibility on the enumerated health status related
factors. 129 Finally, faced with the admission, by virtue of sections 701(a)
and 702(a)(1), of a new plan participant with a pre-existing health condition
(but no pre-existing condition coverage exclusion), a group health plan
could discourage the new participant's enrollment in the plan by charging
a prohibitively higher premium for that particular participant due to the
foreseeable additional cost attributable to coverage and benefits'for the pre-
existing cqndition. Section 702(b)( I) likewise prevents such tactics by
prohibiting the practice of charging a greater premium or contribution to an
individual than to "similarly situated" individuals based upon a health status
related factor. 130
Although the stated congressional intent in enacting HIPAA's provisions
was to prohibit the knowing design of a group health plan to exclude
125. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980D (West Supp. 1997).
126. SeeH.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-736, at 191 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A-
.N. 1990. 2004; Interim Rules for Health Insurance Portability for Group Health Plans, 62
Fed. Reg. 16.894. 16.896 (1997). Private enforcement actions by individual plan participants
for failure to comply with HIPAA, NMHPA, or MHPA requirements would most likely be
brought pursuant to ERISA section 502(a)(3) as an injunctive action to prohibit the plan from
violating Title I requirements for private health care plans. See 29 U.S.c. § 1132(a)(3)
(1994). The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over ERISA section 502(a)(3)-type
claims. See id. § I 132(e)(1).
127. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WalK. PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
LAW 221-22 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing section 401 (a)(4)'s provisions as a necessary corollary
to section 401(b)'s coverage and participation requirements). Of course, unlike qualified
pension plans, in the private health care plan context employers are free to "discriminate" in
benefits provided to employees on the basis of job status. which is often closely associated
with compensation. See. e.g., supra note 121.
128. See supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
130. See supra note 119.
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individuals and their dependents, 13 J HIPAA does not prohibit a plan design
or tenns which are generally applicable to all plan participants, but which
may have a disparate impact on individual enrollees due to the individual's
need for more or specific benefits under the plan. 132 The Conference
Report accompanying HIPAA summarizes the intended effect of HIPAA's
provisions as follows:
The conferees intend that these provisions preclude insurance companies
from denying coverage to employers based on health status and related
factors that they have traditionally used. In addition, this provision is
meant to prohibit insurers or employers from excluding employees in a
group from coverage or charging them higher premiums based on their
health status and other related factors that could lead to higher health costs.
This does not mean that an entire group cannot be charged more. But it
does preclude health plans from singling out individuals in the group for
higher premiums or dropping them from coverage altogether. 133
C. Preemption Under HIPAA
HIPAA signals a potential change in Congress's approach to ERISA's
preemption provisions with respect to those targeted areas where Congress
has acted to create federal coverage and benefits requirements. Although
new ERISA section 731 purports to reaffinn, in part, the preemption status
quo,134 it specifically addresses and alters the preemption scheme for state
insurance laws. 135 Section 731 provides that new ERISA part 7 is not to
be construed to supercede state insurance law standards or requirements
related solely to health insurance issuers in connection with group health
insurance coverage, except to the extent that such state insurance law
requirements prevent the application of one of part 7's requirements. u6
Thus, HIPAA's requirements preempt any related but inconsistent state law
131. SeeH.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-736, at 186 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.c.c.-
A.N. 1990, 1999.
132. See id. Such plan design features having a disparate impact on certain individuals
may, however, violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). See generally Interim
Enforcement Guidance on the Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to
Disability-Based Distinctions in Employer Provided Health Insurance, EEOC-N-915.002 (June
8, 1993), available in WESTLAW, ADA-TAM Database [hereinafter EEOC Interim
Enforcemen~ Guide].
133. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-736, at 187 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A-
.N. 1990,2000.
134. See 29 U.S.CA § 1191(a)(2) (West Supp. 1997) ("Nothing in this part [7] shall
be construed to affect of modify the provisions of [ERISA section 514] ... with respect to
group health plans.").
135. See id. § 1I91(a)(1)-(b).
136. See id. § I 191(a)(1).
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standard or requirement, including state insurance laws. 137 State insurance
laws regulating health insurance issuers are saved from ERISA preemption
only if these laws are more favorable to plan participants than HIPAA's
requirements. 138
HIPAA's preemption of less favorable state insurance law requirements
may presage Congress's future approach to federal health care reform as it
relates to ERISA preemption. HIPAA's preemption provisions effectively
operate as a "floor," establishing a minimum federal standard for the
imposition of pre-existing condition coverage exclusions. '39 . All state
laws, specifically state insurance laws, with requirements less stringent than
HIPAA's minimum federal standard, are preempted. 140 The states remain
free, however, to establish more stringent standards for health insurance
issuers subject to their jurisdiction. 141
HIPAA's approach to preemption, preserving more favorable state
insurance laws while preempting less favorable ones, can be criticized for
being contrary to one of ERISA's original legislative reform objectives: to
provide unifonnity of plan administration by preempting multiple and
possibly inconsisten.t state laws for plans operating in more than one
state. 142 Consistent with this objective, Congress could have preempted
all state insurance laws related to HIPAA's requirements, thus leaving
HIPAA as the sole federal standard. As originally enacted and amended,
however, ERISA involves a balancing of competing interests. '43 In the
case of HIPAA, one of ERISA's legislative purposes, the protection of plan
participants,144 apparently won out over the competing goal of ensuring
simplicity of plan administration. .
137. See id. § 1191(b)(1).
138. See id. § 1191(a)(1), (b)(1).
139. See Interim Rules for Health Insurance Portability for Group Health Plans, 62
Fed. Reg. 16,894, 16.913 (1997).
140. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1191(a)-(b).
141. See id.
142. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
143. See Varity Corp. v. Howe. 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996). The Court explained,
[C]ourts may have to take account of competing congressional purposes, such as
Congress' desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the one
hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex that
administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering
welfare benefit plans in the first place.
. Id. at 1070; see also H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at I (1973), reprinted in 1974 V.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4639 ("The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension rights,
but the committee has been constrained to recognize the voluntary nature of private
retirement plans.").
144. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at I, reprinted in 1974 V.S.C.C.A.N. at 4639.
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Moreover, the danger to ERISA's unifonnity of plan administration
objective may be illusory. Prior to the enactment of HIPAA, insured plans
operating in more than one state already were being administered to meet
the respective insurance laws of each state. For insured plans, HIPAA
actually provides a measure of administrative relief by preempting state
insurance laws with requirements less stringent than those of HIPAA and
substituting a baseline federal standard. 14s Self-insured plans, which
previously operated with no standards, are now subject to a single minimum
standard-HIPAA's federal requirements. 146
D. Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996
The Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, signed into
law on September 26, 1996, amends part 7 of Title I of ERISA, previously
created by HIPAA, to establish minimum federal standards for maternity
hospital benefits offered by private health care plans. 147 These new
federal requirements, which are effective for plan years beginning on or
after January I, '1998,148 apply to any private health care plan, whether
insured or uninsured, that has at least two participants who are current
employees. 149
Congress enacted NMHPA in response to the perception, held by both
physicians and the public, that insurers and health care plans were limiting
the duration of plan benefit coverage for postpartum hospital care as a cost-
saving measure at the risk of the safety of mothers and newborns. ISO Prior
to the enactment of NMHPA, twenty-eight states had adopted state insurance
laws establishing minimum post-partum hospital care coverage for mothers
and newborns. lSI These state laws were of only limited effectiveness,
however, because not all states had adopted such laws, and self-insured
private health care plans were not subject to these laws by virtue of ERISA
preemption. ls2
NMHPA does not require private health care plans to provide maternity
benefits. ls3 Rather, the law requires that if a plan provides maternity
hospital care benefits, such benefits must meet NMHPA's minimum duration
145. See supra notes 139-40.
146. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1191(a)-(b).
147. See Pub. L. No. 104-204, §§ 601-606, 110 Stat. 2935, 2935-44 (codified in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.c.A. & 42 U.S.C.A.).
148. See id. § 603(c), 110 Stat. at 2938.
149. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 119Ia(a).
150. S. REP. No. 104-326, at 2 (1996).
151. Id.
152. !d. at 2-3.
153. See 29 U.S.C.A. § I I85(c)(2).
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of hospital stay requirements. 154 NMHPA's standards are based on
medical practice guidelines developed jointly by the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) and the American Academy of
Pediatrics (AAP).155 For a normal vaginal delivery, the minimum hospital
stay is set at forty-eight hours. 156 The minimum hospital stay for birth by
caesarean section is ninety-six hours. 157 The attending health care provid-
er may, after consultation with the mother, discharge the mother and her
newborn child prior to the expiration of the minimum stay requirements. ISS
Private health care plans and health insurance issuers are prohibited from
providing group financial incentives to mothers to encourage them to accept
less than the minimum hospital stay, from penalizing physicians when
patients utilize the minimum hospital stay, or from providing incentives to
physicians to induce their patients to accept less than the minimum hospital
stay.159
In enacting NMHPA's requirements, Congress recognized it was
breaking new legislative ground. 160 The medical community, long
opposed to congressional legislation impacting physicians' clinical decision-
making, was "virtually unanimous" in its support ofNMHPA as a means of
insulating doctors from pressure by insurers and health plans for the early
discharge of maternity patients. 161 Although medical studies on the
adverse effects of early discharge had proven inconclusive, Congress
admittedly erred on the side of caution in adopting NMHPA's minimum
duration post-partum hospital stay requirements based on the ACOGIAAP
medical practice guidelines. 162
NMHPA's preemption provisions are modeled after the new approach
to state law preemption used by Congress in HIPAA. 163 As with HIPAA,
NMHPA's amendments to ERISA preserve state insurance laws which are
more favorable to covered individuals. l64 Likewise, NMHPA's require-
ments are enforced through COBRA-type tax penalties and civil enforcement
actions pursuant to ERISA. 165
154. See id. ~ 1185(a).
155. See S. REP. No. 104-326. at 2-7.
156. See 29 V.S.c.A. § I I85(a)(1 )(A)(i).
157. See id. § 1185(a)(I)(A)(ii).
158. See id. § I 185(a)(2).
159. See id. § 1185(b).
160. See S. REP. No. 104-326, at 6.
161. See id. at 7.
162. See id. at 4-5 (scientific studies on early discharge inconclusive); see a/so id. at
20-21 (additional views of Sen. Jeffords).
163. See discussion supra Part H.C.
164. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185(t).
165. See supra notes 124, 126 and accompanying text.
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The original Senate version of HIPAA contained a prOVISIOn that
broadly prohibited any group health plan or insurer offering group or
individual health coverage "from imposing treatment limitations or financial
requirements on the coverage of mental health services if similar require-
ments are not imposed on coverage for services for other conditions.,,166
The House version of HIPAA, however, did not require "parity" for mental
health benefits. 16? The Senate's mental health parity provision was
dropped as part of the Joint Conference Committee agreement reconciling
the House and Senate versions of HIPAA. '68
Weeks later, mental health parity legislation reappeared in Congress, but
in a much more limited form. 169 As enacted, the Mental Health Parity Act
amends part 7 of Title I of ERISA to prohibit any group health plan that
provides both medical and mental health benefits from imposing lesser
aggregate lifetime or annual limits for mental health benefits than for
medical care benefits. 170 MHPA's requirements exempt small employ-
ersl?1 and MHPA's parity requirements expressly do not apply to treat-
ment for substance abuse or chemical dependency.172 Congress also
included a sunset provision in MHPA, causing its requirements to expire on
September 30,2001. 173 Like HIPAA and NMHPA, MHPA's requirements
are enforced through COBRA-type tax penalties and civil enforcement
actions pursuant to ERISA. 1?4
MHPA's parity requirements can be easily circumvented by plans or
insurers interested in limiting participants' usage of mental health related
services because group health plans are not required to provide any mental




169. See Pub. L. No. 104-204, § 702, 110 Stat. 2944-47 (codified in scattered sections
of 29 U.S.C.A. & 42 U.S.C.A.).
170. 29 U.S.C.A. § I I85a(a) (West Supp. 1997). The MHPA is effective for plan
years beginning on or after January I, 1998. See Pub. L. No. 104-204, § 702(c), 110 Stat.
at 2947.
171. See 29 U.S.C.A. § I I85a(c)( I) (West Supp. 1997). A small employer is defined
as an employer who, with respect to a calendar year and a plan year, employed an average
of at least 2 but not more than 50 employees on business days during the preceding calendar
year and who employs at least 2 employees on the first day of the plan year. See id. §
I I85a(c)(I )(B).
172. See id. § 1185a(e)(4).
173. See id. § II 85a(f).
174. See supra notes 124, 126 and accompanying text.
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health benefits. 175 Thus, for self-insured plans, plan sponsors who want
to avoid MHPA's requirements may simply eliminate all mental health
benefits from the plan. 176 Alternatively, a plan may restrict mental health
benefits other than aggregate or annual limits which are designed to deter
plan participants from utilizing mental health services. 177 Such restrictions
might include limits on the number of visits or days of in-patient hospital
coverage, higher deductibles, or more stringent requirements relating to
medical necessity.178 Moreover, if the costs of the plan increase by at
least one percent as a result of the application of MHPA's parity require-
ments, the plan is exempted from MHPA's parity requirements in future
years. 179
F. A New Role for ERISA in the Regulation ofPrivate Health Care
Plans?
HIPAA and its related legislation signal a possible new role for ERISA
in future federal health care reform initiatives. Future federal reforms are
likely to target selected, discrete areas rather than attempting comprehensive
reforms. These targeted legislative reforms are likely to be addressed first
at the state level through insurance law mandates for certain types of
benefits. Once a critical mass of states has accumulated experience in a
particular benefit area, Congress is likely to follow by "federalizing" th~
benefit as an ERISA requirement applicable to all private health care plans,
insured and .self-insured alike.
HIPAA and its related legislation also signal a new congressional ap-
proach to ERISA preemption of state laws in those targeted areas where
Congress creates federal coverage and benefits requirements for private
health care plans under ERISA. As new federal requirements for private
health care plans are enacted through Title I, federal preemption is likely to
operate as a floor, preempting state laws that fall below the new minimum
federal requirements. State laws providing greater protections and benefits
than ERISA's minimum federal requirements are likely to be preserved.
Thus, in the future, ERISA preemption of state laws may operate to create
a set of minimum national standards for all private health care plans, while
175. See 29 U.S.C.A. § I I85a(b)(1 ).
176. See id. § 1185a(b)(2). Such action apparently would not violate the ADA. See
general(v EEOC Interim Enforcement Guide, supra note 132. Insured plans may be subject
to state insurance law mandated health care benefits, which are not preempted by the
MHPA's requirements. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1191(a)(2) (West Supp~ 1997); 29 U.S.c. §
I I44(b)(2)(A) (1994); see, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins, Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724
(1985).
177. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(b)(2).
178. See id.
179. See id. § I I85a(c)(2),
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at the same time permitting the states to provide still greater benefits and
protections for participants in insured private health care plans.
III. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS: SOME OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS
HIPAA and its related legislation indicate that ERISA is likely to be the
legislative vehicle of choice for Congress's future health care reform
initiatives. The majority of Americans under age sixty-five with private
health care insurance have that coverage through an employment-based
health care plan. 180 ERISA is the primary federal law regulating employ-
ment-based private health care plans. Consequently, ERISA is the most
obvious and most convenient mechanism for Congress to enact future
federal health care reforms.
Part II of this article envisions a future scenario in which Congress
enacts health care reform by targeting selected, discrete areas for ERISA-
mandated private health care plan coverage and benefits. A discussion of
the merits of this targeted legislative approach to health care reform (a
pejorative "ad hoc" approach or a prudent "incremental reform" approach,
depending on one's point of view) is beyond the scope of this article.
Consistent with the theme of this symposium, Part III of this article
concludes by identifying some of the emerging issues raised by a targeted
reform approach for the future role of ERISA in the regulation of private
health care plans.
Future attempts at health care reform through ERISA are likely to
conflict with the voluntary nature of employment-based health care plans.
This conflict, although mitigated somewhat by "targeted" reforms, neverthe-
less is likely to grow in significance as such reforms multiply into
cumulative requirements. ERISA does not require an employer to sponsor
a health care plan for its employees. lSI ERISA mandates that if the plan
sponsor chooses to offer a health care plan to employees, the plan must
meet Title I requirements for the protection of plan participants. 182
Inherently, the objective of protecting plan participants is in tension with the
competing concern that ERISA's requirements should not be so burdensome
that employers will choose not to sponsor employee benefit plans. ls3
NMHPA and MHPA implicitly recognize and potentially reconcile this
fundamental conflict in that they do not require private health care plans to
offer maternity or mental health benefits lS4 (although, for insured plans,
these benefits may be mandated by state insurance laws). Rather, if these
types of benefits are offered, the plan's benefits must at least meet the new
180. See supra note 6.
181. See generally supra note 143 and accompanying text.
182. See discussion supra Part II.
183. See supra note 143.
184. See 29 U.S.c.A. §§ I 185(c)(2), 1185a(b)(I).
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mInimum federal requirements. 18s Thus, at least with respect to self-
insured plans, the decision whether to offer the benefits at all is left up to
the plan sponsor.
For some benefits, such as maternity hospital care benefits, this
"voluntary" choice on the part of the self-insured plan sponsor may be
illusory as a practical matter due to employee demand for the particular
benefit. For other types of benefits, such as mental health care benefits, the
plan sponsor may, having been given the option, simply cease to offer the
benefit under the plan.
As ERISA moves into the next century, one of the mos~ controversial
and as yet unresolved issues of health care reform is the potential federal
regulation of private health care plan premium costs. HIPAA and its related
legislation follow the OBRA financing approach, leaving it to the plan
.sponsor (and, in the case of insured plans, the insurance issuer) to determine
the increased cost of federal benefit requirements and how much of that
increased cost will be allocated to the plan participants. HIPAA implicitly
rejects the COBRA financing approach by prohibiting plan sponsors from
charging higher premiums only to- those individuals who are more likely to
use the benefits offered under the plan because they have a pre-existing
condition or are identified as having a health-related factor. 186
It remains to be seen whether, if left unregulated at the federal level,
premium costs will increase to such an ,extent as to significantly reduce
private health care plan coverage. 18? It would be ironic indeed if the
reforms made by HIPAA and its related legislation, which were the
byproduct of the Clinton Administration's ambitious attempt to create
universal health care coverage, in fact result in a decrease in coverage due
to increased premium costs.
As discussed in Part II, HIPAA and its related legislation signal a
possible new congressional approach to ERISA preemption. One conse-
quence of this new approach will be the need for a bright-line definition, at
the federal level, of what constitutes an "insured" plan subject to state
insurance law regulation and mandated benefit requirements. The AMS
case l88 aptly illustrates that as the private sector continues to experiment
with new plan financing arrangements and insurance products, the line
between insured and self-insured plans, and thus the line between state and
federal regulation, will become increasingly blurred. A federal solution will
be required to draw this line. -
185. See discussion supra Part II.D-E.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83, 119.
187. See Interim Rules for Health Insurance Portability for Group Health Plans, 62
Fed. Reg. 16,894, 16,911-12 (1997)(describing Congressional Budget Office estimates ofthe
direct cost to the private sector of compliance with HIPAA's requirements, but noting that
these cost estimates are "subject to considerable uncertainty").
188. III F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussed supra Part I.e.).
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Finally, the future appears to hold a greatly expanded role for the
federal courts in the enforcement of new Title I rights for participants in
private health care plans. The new Title I rights created by HIPAA and its
related legislation are enforceable in federal court as private causes of action
by individual plan participants via ERISA's civil enforcement scheme. 189
Although the most blatant violations are likely to be addressed by state
insurance commissioners or the Secretary of Labor, resources available for
enforcement at the state and federal levels are necessarily limited. With the
potential for class actions and ERISA's provision for the award of attorney's
fees and costs,190 individual plaintiffs are likely to play a significant
enforcement role. Their claims will most likely be heard in the federal
courts. 191
189. See supra notes 126 and accompanying text.
190. See 29 U.S.c. § 1132(g) (1994).
191. See id. § 1132(e)( I)(granting the federal courts exclusivejurisdictionover ERISA
section 502(a)(2)-(a)(3) claims, as provided in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)-(3), and concurrent
jurisdiction with the state courts for denial of plan benefit claims brought pursuant to ERISA
§ 502(a)(I)(B), as provided in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(I)(B».
